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PANEL REPORT 
SYNOPSIS: Reliable probabilities of future damaging 
earthquakes in the New Madrid Fault Zone for purposes 
of mitigation and response planning are not available, 
even though considerable thought and research has gone 
into this question. Generalizations sufficient for 
pre-earthquake planning do exist, however, which 
suggest the need to prepare for at least a 50% chance 
of a 6.0 surface wave magnitude event within a decade, 
but that a repeat of the massive 8.0 magnitude events 
of 1811-12 need not be of concern for at least another 
century or two. The Lorna Prieta was a significant 
stimulus toward greater earthquake planning and 
preparation in the Midwest, but of at least equal 
stimulus were the December 3, 1990, projection of an 
possible earthquake on the New Madrid Fault by Iben 
Browning and the occurrence of a damaging 4.6 
magnitude event near New Hamburg, Missouri, on 
September 26, 1990. The combination of these three 
factors stimulated an unprecedented level of 
earthquake awareness and preparation in the central 
U.S. the benefits of which have already been enjoyed 
and whose benefits will continue for decades to come. 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of what probabilities of future damaging 
earthquakes exist for the New Madrid Fault is one of 
considerable debate and current scientific 
investigation. Considering the extremely limited 
amount of high quality data over such short periods of 
time available for the New Madrid Seismic Zone, this 
debate will probably not be settled for several 
centuries to come. Nevertheless, engineers and 
regional planners need guidance now as to how to 
design and plan for future earthquakes in the Midwest. 
several researchers have addressed the issues of 
earthquake probabilities on the New Madrid Fault. 
Notably, the works of Johnston & Nava (1985), Nishenko 
& Bollinger (1990), and Saucier (1991). There is 
disparity in their conclusions mainly because of 
differences in the assumed statistical models to which 
they subscribe. These differences can only be settled 
in a definitive way by several more centuries of data 
than are now available. The New Madrid Fault is a slow 
moving one (compared to the San Andreas). Hence, if 
the recurrence interval for magnitude 8.0 or greater 
events is measured in periods of 500-700 years, it 
could take millennia before enough statistical data 
are available to express truly reliable probabilities. 
EARTHQUAKE PROBABILITIES 
Based upon current data, a table of recurrence 
intervals for the New Madrid Fault appears in Nuttli 
(1990) on p. 47, Appendix Four, as follows: 
Magnitude Range ExQected Return Interval 
1.0-1.9 Once every 1-2 days 
2.0-2.9 Once every 2 weeks 
3.0-3.9 Once every 4 months 
4.0-4.9 Once every 4 years 
5.0-5.9 once every 4 decades 
6.0-6.9 once every 8 decades 
7.0-7.9 Onc;e every 2 centuries 
8.0-8.9 Once every 5 centuries 
Also found in Nuttli (1990) on p. 39, Appendix Two, we 
find a rounded summary table of probabilities which do 
not exactly correspond to Johnston & Nava (1985), but 
are more closely representative of their conclusions 
than those of Niehenko & Bollinger (1990). The purpose 
of the table found in the Nuttli (1990) publication is 
to provide a simple set of prob•bilities for pre-
earthquake planning to be used by engineers, regional 
planners, and others who need a ball-park estimate by 
which to plan. For these purposes, this table is as 
reliable as any other set of assumptions and would 
lead to an appropriate level of design and planning--
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A 6.3 should happen approximately every 80 years and 
is the size of the one that shook Long Beach, 
California, in 1933 destroying three-quarters of its 
school buildings. The last one of this general size in 
the New Madrid Fault was near Charleston, Missouri, 
October 31, 1895. 
A 7.1 event is the size of Lorna Prieta that struck 
California October 17, 1989. The whole world saw that 
one on television and well understand what such a 
magnitude can mean. However, damages from such an 
event in the Midwest would be twenty-fold because 
seismic building codes have not existed here until 
after Lorna Prieta and the geology of seismic wave 
propagation east of the Rocky Mountains is such that 
the amplitudes of ground motions remain high over more 
than twenty times the area as west of the Rockies. The 
level of damage seen in San Francisco, 60 miles from 
the Lorna Prieta epicenter is approximately what one 
can expect to see in St. Louie, 150 miles away, from 
the same magnitude of event. 
A 7.6 event is thought to be the maximum amount of 
strain energy current accumulated in the New Madrid 
Fault since the energy releases of the nineteenth 
century. This estimate is that of Otto Nuttli while at 
St. Louis University. 
An 8.3 event is not considered credible within out 
lifetimes nor within the lifetimes of several 
generations to come. The last such events were 1811-
12 when during a sequence of more than 2,000 events, 
at least three were thought to be more than 8.0 in 
surface wave magnitudes. Engineers and planners need 
not concern themselves with such possibilities at this 
time, as such cataclysms are not likely for at least 
another century or two from today. 
IMPACT OF LOMA PRIETA ON THE MIDWEST 
The Lorna Prieta earthquake at 5:04 pm Pacific time on 
October 17, 1989, occurred during the opening game of 
the world series and is the most televised earthquake 
in history. It was viewed in real time by millions 
throughout America and the world. It was vicariously 
experienced by millions in the Midwest. 
This event immediately caused midwesterners to reflect 
upon their own faults, namely the New Madrid Fault 
complex which is known to be capable of quakes like 
Lorna Prieta and more. The national news media did not 
lose any time making the connection and featured short 
spots on the evening news within hours after Lorna 
Prieta as to what this meant for the central and 
eastern United States. 
During the next fourteen months, until December 1990, 
the central United states was to engage in more 
earthquake education and preparation than in all 
previous history. Seismic building code bills were 
introduced in several midwestern states with versions 
of such codes passing in Missouri by May 1990, with a 
similar bill to eventually pass in Arkansas as well 
the next year. 
Literally thousands of public presentations were made 
that personally touched hundreds of thousands, 
millions of pieces of literature were distributed on 
earthquake safety, thousands of earthquake videos were 
duplicated and distributed, innumerable articles 
appeared in every corner of the print media, and 
hundreds of engineers and utility officials trained in 
earthquake mitigation and seismic building provisions. 
For the first time in history, virtually every school 
within reach of the New Madrid fault developed and 
practiced an earthquake response plan. For the first 
time in history, virtually every hospital in the 
region also devised and exercises earthquake plans. 
A tremendous amount of beneficial networking also 
occurred with county and state emergency officials 
communicating with local fire, police and ambulance 
services along with cooperative communications between 
businesses, schools, hospitals, and government 
agencies. It was the first time such all-pervasive 
cooperation, planning and communication had ever 
occurred. 
One California official was quoted as saying that 
after December, 1990, the Midwest was better educated 
and prepared for earthquakes than moat of California. 
That would be excluding buildings, of course, inasmuch 
as California contractors have been following seismic 
codes for more than 50 years in some parts of the 
state while in the midwest we are just starting. 
Nevertheless, we are started and some day when a 
really big earthquake hits thousands of lives will be 
saves and billions in losses prevented because of the 
massive grass-roots efforts that took place following 
Lorna Prieta. 
In at least one instance, lives have already been 
saved attributed to the earthquake safety training 
that virtually everyone in the midwest received during 
1990. A tornado struck a western suburb of St. Louis 
in October. A building collapsed containing 80 
people, a small business establishment. As the 
building began to fall, everyone inside knew exactly 
what to do--they ducked and covered just as they had 
been taught during recent earthquake drills. Not one 
person was even injured. The newspaper coverage 
following the incident quoted several of the survivors 
as saying that they credit their earthquake education 
and training with saving their lives. 
It would be misleading not to mention two other 
factors that contributed to the unprecedented levels 
of earthquake awareness and preparation in the midwest 
during 1990. One was the projection by a climatologist 
from New Mexico, Dr. Iben Browning, who said that 
based upon his calculations of tidal forces, there was 
a 50% chance of a damaging earthquake on or about 
December 3, 1990. This was made public almost 
immediately after Lorna Prieta inasmuch as he had made 
a speech in San Francisco only shortly before October 
17, 1989, in which he had implied that a large quake 
could hit the San Francisco area on or about October 
18. The projection did not die, but was kept in the 
public mind throughout 1990 with many believing that 
the possibility was not to be ignored. 
The second factor that stimulated such galvanic action 
on the part of the residents of the midwest was a real 
earthquake that occurred September 26, 1990, centered 
about 15 miles south of Cape Girardeau in a fault zone 
considered by some to be the northern New Madrid Fault 
and by others as the southern Ozark Uplift Seismic 
Region. It is academic which name goes with the fault 
inasmuch as they are connected. The event triggered 
an almost frenzied reaction on the part of thousands 
who ran to stores buying up supplies, camping gear, 
and almost every other sort of emergency supply 
available. The earthquake occurred at 8:19am and by 
that afternoon the merchants of Cape Girardeau had all 
sold out of, among other things, bottled water. 
The September 26 quake whose epicenter was near the 
tiny town of New Hamburg, MO, was felt in seven states 
and did several hundred thousand dollars in damages. 
Most of this damage consisted of small cracks in 
masonry, but a gas pipeline did break in Cape 
Girardeau along with several instances of broken 
windows, including one school. Other damage of a 
serious nature occurred in restricted areas as far as 
Piggott, Arkansas, (80 miles west) and Desoto, 
Illinois, (50 miles north). A slope failure in 
Piggott did some $20,000 in damages to each of two 
houses and minor damage to a third home on the same 
hill. 
While hundreds of insurance claims were filed, few 
were paid inasmuch as almost all of the damage fell 
within the deductiblea which range from 2% to 10% or 
the amount of the policy. Hence, unless damages 
resulted in $2000 or more, the losses were borne by 
the property owners. The event did, however, shock 
the insurance industry into realizing what a 
catastrophe they would have if a truly large 
earthquake were to occur. During the last months of 
1990, tens of thousands of earthquake insurance 
policies were sold in the midwest which probably makes 
the percent of earthquake insured greater there than 




While the final word will be centuries in the making 
as to earthquake probabilities on the New Madrid 
Fault, probabilities with sufficient credibility and 
reliability exist already by which intelligent 
planning can be made in the central United States. 
such probabilities, as presented here in this article, 
are rounded and approximate, but further precision and 
refinement of such forecasts is not really meaningful 
in light of the insufficiencies of current data. The 
New Madrid fault needs to have a lot more large 
earthquakes, which will take centuries, before better 
recurrence rates can be obtained. 
As for the impact of Lorna Prieta on the midwest, a lot 
of lifestyles and ways of thinking have been 
permanently changed in the midwest subsequent to that 
event. While it started October 17, 1989, with the 
earthquake we all saw on television, of at least equal 
importance in influence was the projection of Dr. Iben 
Browning for December 3, 1990, and the real quake of 
September 26, 1990. Browning's earthquake did not 
happen, but his projection was a false alarm in time 
only. It was a real alarm for concern over the 
earthquake future of the central United States. Thanks 
to the events of 1989 and 1990, the Midwest is readier 
than it ever has been before for what we all know is 
inevitable. 
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